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et al.: Wilkins v. National Basketball Association, 857 F. Supp. 1069 (S.
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tiffs' expert's study to be more credible than that performed by the
defendant's expert. Affirmed.
L.H.
NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION V. WILLIAMS

WILKINS V. NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION,

857 F. Supp. 1069

(S.D.N.Y. 1994)
The National Basketball Association ("NBA") and the
twenty-seven teams that compete in it ("Teams") initiated an action seeking a declaratory judgment that the NBA's use of a college draft, salary cap and right of first refusal do not violate antitrust laws. Additionally, the NBA and the Teams wanted to
continue these policies following the expiration of the collective
bargaining agreement which allowed them. The class of players
who were defendants in the NBA's declaratory judgment claim
("Players") counterclaimed, alleging that continuation of the policies in question would be an unreasonable restraint on trade and
thus violate the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §1.
The 1988 Collective Bargaining Agreement, the most recent
agreement between the NBA and the Players, continued the college draft, right of first refusal and salary cap policies as set forth
in earlier agreements. The 1988 Agreement formally expired on
June 23, 1994, at which time the Players demanded the three disputed employment practices be eliminated. The NBA contended
that antitrust law did not apply because, despite the expiration of
the formal agreement, a collective bargaining relationship still existed between the NBA and the Players, and that the non-statutory labor exemption therefore applied.
Held: The court, finding no case on point, agreed with the
NBA that antitrust immunity given by the nonstatutory labor exemption continued as long as a collective bargaining relationship
existed between the NBA and the Players after the expiration of
the formal agreement. Following the reasoning of Bridgeman v.
National Basketball Ass'n, 675 F. Supp. 960 (D.N.J. 1987), the
court refused to accept the Players' contention that antitrust immunity ends the moment a collective bargaining agreement expires. It also indicated that such antitrust immunity survives only
as long as the employer continues the policies in question unchanged and reasonably believes such policies will be continued in
the next collective bargaining agreement. As the three disputed
practices were part of several prior agreements between the NBA
and the Players, the NBA could reasonably believe they would be
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continued.
Finally, noting the conflict between antitrust and labor law
policies, the court found that where a collective bargaining arrangement is established and a valid agreement formed, federal labor law, not antitrust law, controls. Thus, the court granted the
NBA the declaration it sought, finding that the continued implementation of these policies, despite the expiration of the formal
collective bargaining agreement, does not violate antitrust laws as
the Players alleged, as long as the collective bargaining relationship exists.
The court also noted that, even if the nonstatutory exemption
did not apply, the Players' charge that such practices comprise a
per se violation of the Sherman Act would be insufficient. Professional athletic associations are characterized primarily as joint ventures, and are judged under the rule of reason, an analysis of market power and structure designed to assess the actual effects of any
practices in question. The Players failed to show that the alleged
restraints on trade were unreasonably anti-competitive. In fact, the
court pointed out that the college draft, right of first refusal and
salary cap had pro-competitive effects, especially that of maintaining competitive balance throughout the NBA, that may outweigh
any restrictive consequences. Thus, the Players' counterclaims
were denied.
C.K.
No. 92-6331,
No. 93-2018, No. 93-2020, No. 93-3110 1994 U.S. App. Lexis
24084 (10th Cir. Sept. 2, 1994)

PONCA TRIBE OF OKLAHOMA V. STATE OF OKLAHOMA,

This appeal raises Tenth and Eleventh Amendment questions
dealing with the process Indian tribes and states utilize in setting
up gaming facilities on Indian reservations. In 1988, in response to
the proliferation of Indian gaming operations, Congress enacted
the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA"). IGRA is designed to
promote strong leadership and tribal economic development as a
result of gaming facilities, and to provide a federal and state regulatory function to prevent the infiltration of organized crime and
other corrupting influences.
IGRA classifies gaming operations into three degrees, imposing various forms of federal, state and tribal regulations over each
class. Class I gaming, consisting of "social games for minimal
prizes" or as part of tribal celebrations, falls under the complete
regulatory control of the tribal governments. Class II gaming, conhttp://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol11/iss2/12
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